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Existing evidence of educational effects on intergenerational mobility
is associational. This study employs early compulsory schooling laws to
approach a causal estimate of the relationship between education and
mobility in the context of a large-scale policy change. Using IPUMS
Linked Representative Samples ðlinked census dataÞ, regression dis-
continuity models exploit state differences in the timing of compulsory
schooling laws to estimate an intent-to-treat effect on intergenerational
occupational mobility among white males. Despite increasing equality
of attendance, results reveal that compulsory laws initially reduced rel-
ative mobility for the first few cohorts affected by the laws. Among later
cohorts, who were required to attend the maximum years of school,
mobility was similar to prelaw levels. School funding and other data
suggest that structural lag could explain this nonlinear relationship.
It seems, therefore, that educational expansion inadvertently reduced
mobility through institutional inertia rather than elite efforts to main-
tain advantage.
INTRODUCTION
Historical studies of intergenerational mobility typically estimate the de-
gree of relative mobility rather than its causes ðe.g., Ferrie 2005; Xie and
Killewald 2010Þ. Those interested in factors affecting historical mobility
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generally focus on industrialization and find little evidence of a mobility-
industrialization relationship, despite its theoretical appeal ðSorokin 1959;
Kaelble 1981, 1986; see van Leeuwen and Maas ½2010 for a reviewÞ. In-
dustrialization involved a variety of large-scale changes. Perhaps the lack
of evidence reflects an imprecise focus on industrialization, when it was
actually a certain aspect of industrialization that influenced mobility.
Educational expansion was a central feature of industrialization, meet-
ing the growing demand for skilled and socialized workers. At least since
Horace Mann in the 19th century, education reformers and arguably even
the public have perceived education as an equalizing institution that pro-
motes equal opportunity through relative intergenerational mobility. In the
late 1800s, state compulsory schooling laws aimed to overcome different fam-
ily backgrounds by mandating school attendance for all. Did early compul-
sory school attendance laws increase intergenerational occupational mobil-
ity? As this study will show and consistent with existing research ðRauscher
2014Þ, the laws increased equality of school attendance by social background.
However, the potential effect of this educational equality on mobility re-
mains unclear for several reasons.
First, both historical and recent research suggests that, as one level of
schooling expands or becomes more equal, elites may maintain their rel-
ative advantage by acquiring more or better quality schooling ðCollins 1971;
Raftery and Hout 1993; Lucas 2001; Parman 2011Þ. Such unequal responses
may leave intergenerational mobility unchanged or even lower than before
the school reform. For example, Parman ð2011Þ studied Iowa in the early
1900s and found that public school expansion was associated with lower
income mobility.
Second, despite high-quality research, all evidence of the education-
mobility relationship is associational ðe.g., Blau andDuncan 1967; Hout 1988;
Goldin 1999; Breen and Jonsson 2005Þ. Education is a well-established—
and arguably the central—mediating factor between father’s occupation and
individual attainment ðBlau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser
1978; Hout 1988, 1989Þ. Breen ð2010, p. 365Þ highlights an “underlying
assumption . . . that a weakening of the relationship between origins and
educational attainment will lead to a weakening of the relationship between
origins and destinations.” However, the difficulties of intergenerational re-
search have limited the opportunity to establish a causal relationship be-
tween education and intergenerational mobility.
Persell, and Jennifer Jennings, as well as ChangHwan Kim, John Rury, Lynn Davidman,
anonymous reviewers, and members of the New York University IES Predoctoral In-
terdisciplinary Research Training program for helpful feedback. Direct correspondence
to Emily Rauscher, University of Kansas, Department of Sociology, 1415 Jayhawk Bou-
levard, Lawrence, Kansas 66045. E-mail: emily.rauscher@ku.edu
American Journal of Sociology
1698
This content downloaded from 129.237.045.152 on May 04, 2017 09:59:46 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Causal evidence requires an exogenous influence on schooling to rule
out claims that results are driven by unobserved characteristics ðsuch as
motivation or intelligenceÞ of the individuals who choose to achieve more
schooling. Causal effects of education in one generation are well estab-
lished ðe.g., on earnings and mortality; Angrist and Krueger 1991; Lleras-
Muney 2005Þ. However, research has yet to identify the causal effect of
education on intergenerational occupational mobility ðGrawe 2008Þ and
instead has typically relied on descriptive techniques ðCunha, Heckman,
and Navarro 2006Þ.
Third, we do not know under what contexts education mediates the link
between origins and destinations. Status attainment research typically fo-
cuses on the mediating role of education in developed societies. In the late
1800s, as the United States experienced rapid industrialization, education
may have had a different relationship with occupational mobility than it
does today. Furthermore, large-scale policy changes can yield different out-
comes than evidence from smaller-scale educational experiments would
predict. While research typically studies educational effects using small-
scale experiments, rare exceptions find that large-scale educational changes
can yield different and unanticipated results ðAngrist 1995; Torche 2005;
Acemoglu and Johnson 2007; Acemoglu 2010Þ. To fully understand effects
of educational expansion, we must investigate it when schooling changed
for a large number of people.
DOES EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY INCREASE
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY?
Specifically, did 19th-century state compulsory school attendance laws,
which made school attendance more equal by father’s occupation, increase
relative intergenerational occupational mobility?2 Opportunities to inves-
tigate a causal relationship between education and intergenerational mo-
2While education may increase both absolute and relative occupational mobility, this
article focuses on relative mobility. Mobility research has long distinguished between
absolute and relative mobility ðFeatherman and Hauser 1978; Hout 1988Þ. Absolute
mobility is the change in occupational distribution. It measures how much intergener-
ational change in occupations is due to changes in the distribution. Relative mobility is
the degree of occupational change between generations unexplained by distributional
change. It measures social fluidity—the degree to which individual opportunity or oc-
cupational attainment is not associated with parent’s occupation net of distributional
changes ðan imperfect measure because a portion of parent-child association could re-
flect inherited ability and household factors such as socialization; Jencks and Tach 2006Þ.
Education may increase absolute mobility through economic growth, raising occupa-
tional outcomes for everyone ðAcemoglu and Angrist 2000; Cheung and Chan 2008;
Hanushek and Woessmann 2009; Li and Huang 2009Þ. However, as the distribution
shifts up for everyone, relative mobility could remain the same or even decrease. Unless
specified, mobility refers to relative mobility throughout this article.
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bility are rare given data demands. This study uniquely approaches a
causal estimate of the relationship between education and intergenera-
tional mobility. Exploiting state differences in the timing of compulsory
school attendance laws and linked census data from 1850 to 1930 ðwith
occupational information for father-son pairsÞ, this study investigates the
education-mobility relationship in a large-scale setting. At the turn of the
century—an era with high industrialization and rapid educational expan-
sion—did compulsory schooling laws, which increased equality of school
attendance, reduce the importance of father’s occupation for young white
men’s occupational attainment?
The next section provides historical background about 19th-century edu-
cational expansion and early compulsory schooling laws in the United States.
Later sections offer theoretical and empirical background, information about
data and methods, results, and a discussion including potential contem-
porary implications.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
19th-Century American Educational Expansion
School attendance—and the education system in general—expanded through-
out the 1800s, beginning in the Northeast and spreading to the West
ðMeyer et al. 1979Þ. Explanations for postbellum educational expansion—
and the functions schools served—are still contested ðBaker 1999Þ but
largely fall into two categories. One, schools served the labor and sociali-
zation needs of capitalism, industrialization, and urbanization ðKatz 1968;
Bowles and Gintis 1976; Field 1976; Baker 1999Þ. From this perspective,
schools taught skills for life in an increasingly interdependent society and
legitimated inequality, partly by teaching children their social place.
Two, educational expansion—in the United States and throughout the
world—reflected nation-building efforts, specifically evangelical Protes-
tant and Republican efforts in the United States ðMeyer, Ramirez, and
Soysal 1979, 1992Þ. The middle and late 1800s witnessed unprecedented
immigration, particularly from Ireland after the famine, and schools repre-
sented an assimilation tool to Americanize newcomers, assuage native fears
of Catholicism, and teach civic identity to all ðCarlson 1975; McAfee 1998Þ.
Furthermore, economic depressions during the late 1800s ðincluding the
Panic of 1873 and depressions in 1882–85 and 1893–96Þ threatened na-
tional unity and heightened class divisions. Education could help weld so-
ciety back together. Related to nation building, others highlight the central
role of the state in shaping and expanding the educational system ðArcher
1979; Rubinson 1987; Walters 2000; Steffes 2012Þ, possibly through com-
pulsory schooling laws, for example. Aiding the expansion, the common
school provided free education to all through local taxes and rapidly re-
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placed other forms of schooling in the North around the 1840s ðKaestle
1983Þ.
In addition to these explanations, beliefs about the equalizing poten-
tial of education may have helped spur the expansion. Horace Mann—a
19th-century Massachusetts politician and education reformer—was a cham-
pion of the common school. Mann ð1849, p. 59Þ called education “the great
equalizer of the conditions of men” and believed it could promote Ameri-
can identity and access to the middle class. Thus, the belief that education
promotes intergenerational mobility is not unique to today.
Compulsory school attendance laws were the legal arm of 19th-century
educational expansion. For schools to achieve any of the stated goals—
whether to socialize workers or equalize opportunity—students had to at-
tend them. Higher wages for educated workers, individual interests, or val-
ues may have pulled some youth into school ðGoldin and Katz 2008Þ, but
state policies such as compulsory school attendance laws may have pushed
more reluctant ðespecially lower-classÞ youth.
U.S. Compulsory School Attendance Laws
Compulsory education laws in the United States preceded compulsory
schooling or attendance laws by around 200 years. In both cases, Massa-
chusetts led the way. In 1642, Massachusetts required that parents and
masters be responsible for teaching their children and apprentices to read
English and to understand religious principles and laws ðU.S. Bureau of
Education 1914Þ. Five years later, the “old deluder Satan” act of 1647 re-
quired Massachusetts towns of at least 50 households to appoint a teacher
and towns of at least 100 households to establish a grammar school.
Compulsory school attendance laws began in 1852, when Massachusetts
required that all children between ages 8 and 14 attend school for at least
12 weeks. Beginning in the early 1800s, a hodgepodge of laws required
varying lengths of schooling for children working in manufacturing or busi-
ness. The compulsory schooling law was novel because it applied to all
children ðwith exemptions for physical, mental, or economic inabilityÞ, not
just those employed in manufacturing. Noncompliance could be punished
with a fine of up to $20.
The first compulsory schooling laws of other states were remarkably
similar to that of Massachusetts. The children affected were nearly always
ages 8–14. The punishment for noncompliance was generally monetary
and, where information is available, the length of required attendance was
consistently about 12 weeks. Many advantaged children attended school
anyway, and private school remained an option ðfor elites or religious
minoritiesÞ. For the majority, however, compulsory attendance aimed to
corral children from all backgrounds together into a “common school” for
Educational Equality and Mobility
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instruction from a professional teacher. From 1852 to 1918, beginning with
Massachusetts and finishing with Mississippi, each state passed a law
requiring youth to attend school.
Existing studies of early compulsory schooling laws often find that they
had little effect on school attendance ðLandes and Solmon 1972; Edwards
1978; Goldin and Katz 2011Þ. Others argue that only early compulsory
schooling laws were ineffective or symbolic ðTyack 1976Þ, while later
changes to the compulsory laws in the beginning of the 20th century were
successful ðKatz 1976; Lleras-Muney 2005Þ. This evidence of ineffective
laws could reflect imperfect enforcement or exemptions allowed by the law
ðe.g., for physical, mental, or economic inabilityÞ. However, a recent study
by Puerta ð2009Þ contradicts such findings. Using more sophisticated tech-
niques ðcounty-level difference-in-differenceÞ, Puerta finds that compul-
sory laws increased absolute attendance rates by about 7%.
Most important, little research investigates heterogeneous effects by
class, which may explain previous null findings. That is, research has rarely
investigated whether early compulsory laws increased equality of atten-
dance ðRauscher 2014Þ. Discussions of compulsory education around the
time suggest that it should have equalized school attendance. For exam-
ple, in discussing the various laws affecting children of New England, John
Perrin ð1896, p. 71Þ writes: “As the various statutes now stand they con-
stitute a species of class legislation.” He describes compulsory and truancy
laws as “remedial”: “Its design is the correction of existing evils, and the
conversion of the youth belonging to what is known as the ‘dangerous and
perishing classes’ into good citizens” ð1896, p. 71Þ. In a speech supporting
compulsory schooling, Ernest Carroll Moore ð1902, who later became su-
perintendent of Los Angeles schoolsÞ similarly identified children of im-
migrants, deviant or neglectful parents, and the poor as the necessary tar-
gets of compulsory schooling laws, claiming that these children do not or
cannot appreciate the value of education. A legal history of compulsory
attendance laws similarly suggests that they were aimed primarily at poor
or lower-class children ðKotin and Aikman 1980Þ. Despite the potential for
exemptions because of economic inability, therefore, the laws aimed to in-
crease attendance among lower-class children. Because they targeted poor
children, who were least likely to attend, compulsory schooling laws should
make school attendance more equal by class.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
If compulsory laws increased equality of school attendance by father’s
occupation, status attainment and industrialization theories would expect
these laws to make occupational opportunity more equal as well. Both
theories paint education as central to intergenerational mobility ðBlau and
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Duncan 1967; Treiman 1970Þ.3 At the individual level, Blau and Duncan
ð1967Þ famously find that educational attainment plays the largest role in
occupational attainment. It mediates the link between origins ðfather’s
occupation and educationÞ and occupational destination, but it also has an
important independent effect, suggesting that ðfor white menÞ the U.S.
occupational system is primarily based on universalistic criteria through
education. This model has been complicated and expanded ðe.g., Sewell,
Haller, and Portes 1969Þ, but the centrality of education has remained de-
spite the model’s basis on associational evidence. At the societal level, in-
dustrialization theory similarly expects mass education to increase mobility
by making skills and cultural values more similar by class and encourag-
ing employers to rely on educational achievement to remain competitive
ðTreiman 1970Þ. As with attainment, studies of the industrialization thesis
are associational, not causal ðGrusky 1983Þ.
While education is clearly associated with the link between origin and
destination, other factors, such as individual motivation or economic growth
of a society, may drive the education-mobility relationship. Furthermore,
large-scale increases in education could yield different effects. Educational
expansion could generate credential inflation without improving mobility
ðPerkinson 1968; Berg 1971; Collins 1971; Milner 1972; Boudon 1974Þ. Em-
pirical evidence from Ireland, Chile, and the United Kingdom indicates that
expansion can increase class inequality at certain education levels ðRaftery
and Hout 1993; Torche 2005; Paterson and Iannelli 2007Þ. Multiple theories
explain why expanding access to schooling might decrease mobility. Col-
lins’s ð1971Þ interpretation of conflict theory, for example, would expect
elites to attain more schooling if one level became widespread. Similarly,
as one level becomes more equal, differences in the quantity or quality of
schooling may become more important ðRaftery and Hout 1993; Lucas
2001Þ. In terms of mobility, while education may increase intergenerational
opportunity in other areas ðOreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2006; Attewell
and Lavin 2007Þ, its effect on occupational mobility could be different.
Parman ð2011Þ and Grawe ð2010Þ find that improvements in public school
quality are associated with declines in intergenerational income mobility,
possibly because higher-income families take more advantage of better-
quality schools. From these perspectives, compulsory schooling is likely ei-
ther to have no effect or to decrease occupational mobility because elites
3Human capital and social network theories ðBecker 1964; Granovetter 1973Þ suggest
that education could either weaken the effect of class background on attainment through
more equal access to valuable skills and social ties or mediate the origin-destination
relationship ðBecker and Tomes 1994Þ. In the 19th century, compulsory education could
also take youth away from apprenticeships or employment that provided valuable
human or social capital. If on-the-job training was more valuable than schooling in the
1800s, compulsory schooling could reduce mobility despite adding human capital. Given
this ambiguity, other theories are more useful here.
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will work to maintain their relative advantage in quantity or quality of
education.
Alternatively, structural lag ðRiley et al. 1994Þ expects increased school
attendance to reduce mobility—at least initially. Structural lag, developed
in the context of the mismatch between cohort size or characteristics and
institutional change, suggests that institutions change more slowly than the
people in them ðRiley et al. 1994Þ. An example occurs when a cohort is
larger or more diverse than the roles allotted to it. Applied to compulsory
schooling, structural lag suggests that the school system may be slow to
adapt to the increase in number and diversity of students. Because of the
delayed institutional response, school performance and learning should ini-
tially decline. For example, as truants and other new types of students
attend school for the first time, they could disrupt everyone’s learning
through poor discipline, infrequent attendance, or classroom crowding.
These declines in quality would affect any school gaining new students but
would be concentrated in schools attended by lower-class children, who
were targeted by the laws. Thus, even without elites working to maintain
advantage, greater attendance of lower-class youth would perversely de-
crease class equality in the quality of schooling received. If school systems
eventually responded, however, we would see a nonlinear pattern. In other
words, mobility could initially decrease after the compulsory laws and then
increase once institutions responded and adapted to the policy change. Evi-
dence supporting this theory would include a delayed increase in school
funding or teacher-to-student ratio after the compulsory law, suggesting
that the system was slow to respond but eventually accommodated more
students who were less prepared for school.
A growing body of research investigates the effects of more recent
changes to compulsory schooling laws, including extensions of the com-
pulsory schooling age ðLochner and Moretti 2004; Lleras-Muney 2005;
Oreopoulos et al. 2006; see Brunello, Fort, and Weber ½2009 for a reviewÞ.
Evidence consistently suggests that these extensions improve a variety of
outcomes among the affected youth, including years of schooling and labor
market outcomes ðOreopoulos 2006; Brunello et al. 2009Þ. Moreover, the
youth affected by these changes in compulsory schooling laws tend to be
from lower-class backgrounds, suggesting that extended compulsory school-
ing increases intergenerational mobility.
The structural lag theory posits a key potential difference between ef-
fects of the first compulsory school attendance laws ðstudied hereÞ and later
extensions of the compulsory schooling age: effects on children who would
have attended regardless of the legal change. These youth, referred to as
“always takers” by statisticians developing causal inference techniques ðAn-
grist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996, p. 448Þ, would attend school even without
American Journal of Sociology
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the law, while “compliers”would change their behavior because of the legal
change. With more recent changes to compulsory laws, educational insti-
tutions were adequately equipped to enroll more students for a longer pe-
riod of time. At the time of the initial compulsory laws, however, schools
may have been unprepared to absorb a sudden influx of new students who
had never attended school. Moreover, because the laws aimed to increase
attendance among lower-class youth, schools in lower-class neighborhoods
should have experienced greater increases in enrollment with the laws than
schools in upper-class areas. Structural lag theory suggests, therefore, that
early compulsory schooling laws may have affected “always takers” differ-
ently by class. Lower-class youth who would have attended school anyway
could be negatively affected by the compulsory law if it reduced the quality
of schooling received because of the influx of new students. In contrast,
higher-class youth who would have attended anyway would remain largely
unaffected by the compulsory law, similar to the “always takers” in research
on more recent changes to compulsory laws.
As Hong and Raudenbush ð2006Þ note, an influx of compliers can change
the experiences of always takers. Thus, despite convincing evidence that
more recent extensions of compulsory schooling laws improve outcomes
among lower-class youth ðOreopoulos 2006; Brunello et al. 2009Þ, and should
therefore increase intergenerational mobility, effects of the early compul-
sory laws studied here could yield different results by changing the coun-
terfactual comparison group. That is, research on more recent compulsory
changes compares those affected by extended compulsory schooling laws to
a group who ðat least based on stable unit treatment value assumptionsÞ
should have remained largely unaffected by the extended law. With the
early laws studied here, however, structural lag theory suggests that those
induced to attend by the law will be compared to a group whose schooling
may have been disrupted by the law, and this disruption was unequally
distributed by class.
HYPOTHESES
HYPOTHESIS 1.—According to status attainment theory and the indus-
trialization thesis, compulsory education should increase relative mobility.
Compared to otherwise similar individuals, the occupation of those re-
quired to attend school should depend less on their father’s occupation.
HYPOTHESIS 2.—According to conflict theory, compulsory education
should have either no effect or decrease relative mobility.
HYPOTHESIS 3.—Structural lag expects a nonlinear effect, with mobility
initially decreasing after a compulsory law and then increasing again after
the school system adapted to the change.
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DATA
Recently released linked census data allow two observations of the same
person ðnot possible with regular census dataÞ, providing both occupa-
tional background and outcome data. Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series ðIPUMSÞ Linked Representative Samples include individuals in the
1850–1930 censuses linked to the complete 1880 census ðRuggles et al.
2010; for a description, see Ruggles ½2011Þ. The linking yields samples
from seven pairs of censuses, which are pooled here: 1850–80, 1860–80,
1870–80, 1880–1900, 1880–1910, 1880–1920, and 1880–1930.4 At the first
census observation, I gathered father’s occupation and other background
data for those who were children living in their father’s household. Follow-
ing these children to the second census observation period, I observed their
own occupational attainment as adults. Figure 1 illustrates the data struc-
ture. All observations are linked to the 1880 census because that is the only
100% census. Therefore, the linked data include children in 1850, 1860, or
1870, who later reappear as adults in 1880. Similarly, the data include chil-
dren in 1880, who later reappear as adults in the 1900, 1910, 1920, or 1930
census. As a hypothetical example, imagine that we observe Joe Green at
age 10 in the 1880 census, along with information about his social origins,
including his father’s occupation. Twenty years later, the 1900 census in-
cludes occupational information about Joe Green, now an adult ðage 30Þ.
I limit the sample to linked white boys who were under age 14 and either
a child, grandchild, or nephew of the household head in the first census.
The sample also excludes anyone younger than age 17 by the second cen-
sus. This could give a relatively young occupational outcome measure for
some individuals. However, adulthood and employment occurred earlier
at the turn of the century, and age controls help address early outcome
measurement. I limit analysis to white men because status attainment
theory expects education to boost their occupational opportunity the most
ðbecause of discrimination facing women and minoritiesÞ. Studying the
effect on white men stacks the odds in favor of finding evidence to support
status attainment or industrialization arguments and would make alter-
native results more surprising.5 Individuals from families who immigrated
4The 1890 census was destroyed by fire in 1921 and could not be linked. The missing
1890 census does not invalidate the study because it is missing for everyone, not just
those required to attend or not required to attend school. If the 1890 census were avail-
able it would not substantially increase the sample size for this study. Individuals would
only be 10 years older in 1890 than they were at the first observation in 1880, so only a
select group would be old enough to count as adults. The lack of the 1890 census may in
fact yield a better estimate of mobility because individuals are older, on average, for
their adult occupation measure.
5Furthermore, women who changed their last name could not be linked, leaving a non-
representative sample. Record quality for nonwhites is most likely poor and dependent on
region—particularly prior to 1870, when slaves were not even included in the census.
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after 1880 do not appear in the linked data set. The main analysis is lim-
ited to native white men but includes foreign-born individuals who were
younger than age eight in the first census ði.e., spent their school-age years
in the United StatesÞ.6 Children in states that made school compulsory after
1890 are excluded to ensure statistical support in each state and because
late-adopting states are overwhelmingly in the South, which may have im-
portant mobility differences. The youngest cohort in the linked data was
born in 1880, so no individuals in late-adopting states were required to at-
tend any years of school. Without statistical support ði.e., some children
required to attend school and some not requiredÞ, late-adopting states—
including all states in the South—are excluded, and results cannot gener-
alize to those areas.
One potential concern is validity of the linked data. IPUMS took pre-
cautions and created weights ðused throughout this analysisÞ to correct
for bias in linking and to ensure that the samples represent the population
who survived between census years.7 Furthermore, the emphasis here is on
internal, not external, validity. Comparison of those who happened to be
school age at the time of the law versus those who narrowly missed being
required to attend suggests that—because linking does not differ system-
atically by required schooling—the data are valid for this analysis.8
6Sensitivity analyses excluding all foreign-born individuals do not change results.
7 IPUMS linked individuals on the basis of birth year, place of birth, first name, last name,
and race. Exact matches were required for place of birth and race, but age and namewere
allowed to vary slightly. The linking strategy purposely ignored coresidents and place of
residence to avoid overrepresenting nonmovers and those who live with family members.
See http://usa.ipums.org/usa/linked_data_samples.shtml for more information. A com-
parison of linked and regular census data is available upon request.
8Historians raise concerns about the quality of 19th-century census data, particularly
the 1870 census ðSteckel 1991Þ. However, the greatest concern was about undercounting
FIG. 1.—IPUMSLinkedRepresentative Samples data structure. Children in the 1850,
1860, and 1870 censuses are linked to their record in the 100% 1880 census. Children in
the 1880 census are linked to their record in the 1900, 1910, 1920, or 1930 censuses. This
data structure allows two observations of the same individual—once as a child in their
father’s household and later as an adult. Observations are weighted to correct for un-
equal probability of linking.
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MEASURES
Occupation
IPUMS provides socioeconomic index ðSEIÞ and occupational income
scores standardized to 1950 for all of the linked census years. SEI score,
sometimes considered occupational status, is based on the median income
and educational attainment associated with each occupation among men
in 1950.9 Occupational income score measures the median income of those
in the occupation in 1950. The main analysis uses SEI scores, but occupa-
tional income scores yield similar results.10 Although most research studies
effects of education on earnings, Hauser ð1998Þ suggests that occupational
status stabilizes relatively early in life and is less volatile so may provide a
better measure of intergenerational mobility.
There were many changes in occupational distribution and classification
from the late 1800s to 1950 with industrialization and Taylorism ðsee, e.g.,
Conk ½1978 on classification changesÞ, but standardized scales are essen-
tial for this analysis because they allow meaningful intergenerational com-
parisons across multiple census years. Changes in the average income or
status of occupations over time that are not captured in the standardized
1950 scores would add error to the measurement. However, this analysis is
interested in how intergenerational occupational association changed with
the compulsory laws. Therefore, the income or status of occupations would
have to change systematically with compulsory assignment in order to
threaten internal validity. This would require, for example, that—as op-
posed to simply changing over time—when the individuals in the sample
reached adulthood, the SEI of an occupation ðe.g., clerk or salesmanÞ would
have to have changed more for those required to attend school compared to
those not required to attend. Such a scenario seems unlikely if not impos-
sible, given that individuals in the sample are all within a narrow range of
the law and occupational characteristics are defined by the education and
income of all individuals with that job. Nevertheless, to increase compa-
9Because SEI is partly based on educational attainment, predicting SEI score may
overestimate the effect of education on mobility. However, as Pascarella and Terenzini
ð2005Þ point out, even when using a status measure that incorporates education, the
relationship between education and occupational status is not clear.
10Research distinguishes various measures of social standing, particularly earnings and
occupational scores ðBjorklund and Jantti 2000; Beller and Hout 2006; Torche 2011Þ.
Occupational income score is the closest proxy for earnings and could show a different
mobility pattern than status score ðif education increased income mobility more than
status mobility, for exampleÞ.
of blacks in the South, neither of which are included here. Sensitivity analyses excluding
each census individually yield similar results. Furthermore, unless census errors system-
atically differ by compulsory assignment, theywill not threaten this analysis because I am
concerned with how measures changed with the compulsory laws, not raw measurements.
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rability with existing research ðe.g., Featherman and Hauser 1978; Hout
1984; Hout 1989Þ and address concerns about continuous measures of oc-
cupational standing, supplementary analyses use occupational categories
and yield similar results. See the appendix for details about the categorical
measure of occupation, methods, and results.
Compulsory Assignment Indicator
State year of compulsory education, shown in table 1, is gathered from
the U.S. Bureau of Education ð1914, p. 10Þ.11 Combining state of residence
TABLE 1
Year of First Compulsory Education Law by State
State Compulsory School Year
Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1852
District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1864
Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1867
Michigan, New Hampshire, Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1871
Connecticut, New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1872
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1873
California, Kansas, New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1874
Maine, New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1875
Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1876
Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1877
Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1879
Illinois, Montana, North/South Dakota, Rhode Island . . . . . 1883
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1885
Nebraska, Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1887
Colorado, Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1889
Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1890
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1895
Hawaii, Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1896
Indiana, West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1897
Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1899
Iowa, Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1902
Missouri, Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1905
Delaware, North Carolina, Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1907
Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1908
Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1909
Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1910
Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1915
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1916
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1918
Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1929
NOTE.—Data are from the U.S. Bureau of Education ð1914, p. 10Þ; U.S. Bureau of the
Census ð1924, p. 22Þ.
11Dates after 1914 are from the 1920 U.S. Census ð1924, table 5, pp. 22–23Þ, confirmed
by Goldin and Katz ð2008Þ and Steinhilber and Sokolowski ð1966, p. 3Þ. There is general
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as a child, year of compulsory education law, ages at which the state law
required attendance, and birth year, a dummy variable indicates whether
an individual was ever school age after the law passed. In most states,
compulsory laws required attendance for children ages 8–14 ðSteinhilber
and Sokolowski 1966Þ, but a few states required attendance until age 15
ðMaine, Rhode Island, WisconsinÞ or age 16 ðConnecticut, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, WyomingÞ. In some cases, the law went into effect the
year after it was passed. Even when the law went into effect the year it
passed, many children would be a year older by the start of the next school
year. Therefore, in creating the indicator for compulsory assignment, in-
dividuals who were the maximum age at which attendance was required
when the law was passed are not considered part of the compulsory group.
Everyone one year below the maximum age at the time of the law is in-
cluded in the compulsory group because they were legally required to at-
tend school for at least one school term.12
Years of School Required
To investigate nonlinear effects, I also create a measure of exposure to
compulsory education. An individual just inside the age cutoff ð14 in
most statesÞ would be required to attend school for one year. Those a year
younger should attend for two years and so on. Although most states
12Another reason for choosing this cutoff, historians have noted, is that early compul-
sory laws were poorly enforced and employment was common and even encouraged
among older youth around age 13 or 14 ðTyack 1974Þ. Compulsory laws are therefore
more likely to influence younger children under the maximum age required at the time
of the law, when social norms and any child labor laws may have restricted employment.
A few states ðe.g., Ohio, Rhode Island, ColoradoÞ passed child employment laws that
specifically applied to children under age 14 in the same year as the attendance law. To
address the possibility that any apparent effects of compulsory schooling laws depend on
child labor laws, sensitivity analyses add controls for state child labor laws and individual
exposure to child labor laws ðchild labor law dates are based on Loughran ½1921Þ.
The profusion of labor laws, which often applied to very specific groups during limited
hours, makes it difficult to measure them accurately. The main analyses focus on com-
pulsory schooling laws, but table A5 in the appendix provides results of sensitivity anal-
yses that control for individual exposure to a child labor law through age 16 ðbased on
state of residence as a childÞ. Other sensitivity analyses ðnot shownÞ control for in-
dividual childhood years after a labor law and an indicator for whether an individual
was ever covered by a child labor law. Results of these analyses are consistent with the
main analyses.
agreement about the year of the first compulsory law in each state but slight disagree-
ment about Kentucky ð1896 vs. 1893Þ and Louisiana ð1916 vs. 1910Þ. Steinhilber and
Sokolowski ð1966, p. 3Þ list different dates for New Mexico ð1891Þ and Texas ð1873Þ
than those provided by the Bureau of Education. Supplementary analyses assess sen-
sitivity to assigning compulsory attendance based on these differences and do not
change results. Note that disagreements about post-1890 dates are irrelevant for this
study because those states are excluded to ensure statistical support.
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required attendance from ages 8 to 14, the length was slightly different in
other states. For example, Connecticut andMinnesota required attendance
from age 8 to age 16, New Hampshire from 6 to 16, Rhode Island and
Wisconsin from 7 to 15, andWyoming from 7 to 16. To prevent individuals
in these few states with different age requirements from being the only ones
with higher ranges and driving the results, the range is capped from 0 to
9 for all states. Also, because states often expanded the required length of
schooling after the first passage of the law, some students in states that
initially required seven years were required to attend for up to nine years
ðe.g., Ohio, New JerseyÞ. Thus, each individual in the sample is assigned
a length of required school attendance based on year of birth, age at the
time of the law, state of residence, and ages at which the first compulsory
schooling law in each state required attendance.
Because I limit the sample to those 10 years on each side of the com-
pulsory cutoff, years of school required also measures time since the law. In
other words, it measures both how long each individual was legally re-
quired to attend school and how much time had passed since the law when
that individual had to attend. Length of required attendance is therefore
confounded with time since the law. The final step in this analysis offers
some evidence to disentangle these concepts, but analysis using this mea-
sure cannot definitively identify which is the driving factor.
School Attendance
School attendance—available from 1850 to 1880 when the linked sample
were children—is an indicator for whether an individual attended school
in the last year. While census data provide a large sample, a limitation is
that this is the only measure of education. Educational attainment was not
recorded until the 1940 census. Nevertheless, the attendance indicator is
not a bad measure given the flexibility of compulsory requirements. The
laws generally required attendance for 12 weeks, only six of them con-
secutive. Intermittent attendance, permitted by the law, may not have been
captured with other questions.13
A complication is that school attendance is only recorded at the year of
the census. We therefore do not know whether an individual ever attended
school, only if he attended within the last year. This requires limiting anal-
ysis of school attendance to those who were school age in the year prior to
13Daily school attendance was well below the number of students enrolled or registered.
Lassonde ð1996Þ notes about antebellum New Haven that only around two-thirds of
those registered actually attended on a given day. If it were available, daily attendance
could add more nuance to the investigation. Its absence, however, does not detract from
the main analysis of the effect of the laws on mobility, which uses a reduced form ap-
proach to reduce bias.
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the census. All school attendance analyses therefore exclude those under
age eight. This complication also requires using slightly altered compulsory
measures in regressions predicting school attendance ðbut not adult occu-
pationÞ: individuals in states that have not yet passed the compulsory law,
but who may be exposed to the law in the future, are coded zero years
required and noncompulsory.
Finally, school attendance is not available for the 100% 1880 census,
which is used for the linked data. Only those in the smaller 1% or 10% 1880
samples have this information.14 Literacy would be an alternate measure
and would address questions of skills gained from schooling. However,
literacy is not recorded for children in early censuses, is not available in the
100% 1880 census, and is nearly universal ð99.4%Þ among adults in the
linked sample, so it offers little variation. To overcome these limitations,
I rely primarily on school attendance data in the regular ðunlinkedÞ census
data. An intent-to-treat analysis of effects of compulsory laws on mobility
allows inclusion of youth who are missing school attendance information
or were not school age at the time of the census, bypassing the first-stage
attendance measure.
Additional Measures
Other measures include age, birth cohort, rural residence, and state of res-
idence. State-level measures included as controls are gathered from ICPSR
ð1970Þ Historical Census Data 1790–70, supplemented with information
from original census tables and a compilation of statistical abstracts ðU.S.
Bureau of the Census 1975Þ. Historical data from Behrens, Uggen, and
Manza ð2003Þ provide governor partisanship information.15
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics among all sons in the linked data
sample, separately for those ever and never required to attend school. A
few points are worth noting about table 2. First, mean father’s occupational
score is nearly always lower than son’s, which suggests distributional
changes in occupations between generations. Therefore, all regressions use
standardized measures of individual and father’s SEI scores.
Second, son’s average age as an adult is younger than father’s average
age. This means that son’s occupational outcome is measured at a younger
14 In their FAQ ðhttps://usa.ipums.org/usa/linked_data_samples_FAQ.shtmlÞ about the
linked data, IPUMS notes that school attendance information for 1880 was entered and
released with the preliminary linked representative samples. The final version of the
linked data ðused hereÞ only includes 1880 attendance information for those in the pre-
liminary release. Thus, attendance is missing for 69% of the sample observed as school-
age children in 1880.
15Many thanks to Jeff Manza, Christopher Uggen, and Angela Behrens for generously
sharing their data.
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age than father’s, on average. This is not ideal, because individuals may
achieve a higher occupational outcome later in life and analyses could mis-
estimate mobility. Estimates should not be biased as long as age at occu-
pation is unrelated to compulsory assignment. However, age at adult obser-
vation is higher among those required to attend school, and compulsory
education is required for younger cohorts in each state. To assess sensi-
tivity to this potential age bias, I therefore replicate analyses when limiting
the sample to individuals ages 30–64 as adults.16 This reduces the difference
in age at occupation ðtime 2Þ between the compulsory and noncompulsory
groups to only two years and yields similar results ðpresented belowÞ.
Finally, the proportion noting that they attended school within the last
year is significantly higher among those not required to attend school. This
is puzzling but most likely reflects lack of complete school attendance in-
formation for those observed as children in the 1880 census.17 School at-
tendance information is not missing at random with respect to census year
of observation. Therefore, attendance data among those required to attend
is more often from earlier census years, when overall attendance rates were
lower. The nonrandommissing data most likely explain the low attendance
rates in the compulsory group shown in table 2. To address concerns about
attendance information in the linked data, I show results predicting school
attendance among individuals in 1850–80 regular census data. Table 3 shows
descriptive statistics for school-age white boys in the regular 1850–80 cen-
suses. Results of attendance analyses in the linked and regular data are
consistent.
Tables 2 and 3 also include the correlation between father’s SEI and
school attendance. In the linked data, this correlation is 0.06 in the non-
compulsory group and zero in the compulsory group. Among white boys
16Age bias is a concern in studies of earnings ðe.g., Haider and Solon 2006Þ because
earnings can change drastically over the lifespan. Based on data from the mid to late
20th century, occupation is less volatile and stabilizes relatively early in life ðHauser
1998Þ, which suggests that age at occupation is less of a concern. Furthermore, men in
the early 1900s may have achieved their permanent occupation at a younger age ðgiven
shorter life spans and average length of schoolingÞ. Nevertheless, the age 30–64 sample
helps address concerns about age bias by excluding younger individuals who may or
may not have already achieved their highest occupational status.
17See n. 14. Of the potential school-age cases in the linked data, 59% of those required to
attend school are missing school attendance data, compared to only 26% of those not re-
quired to attend. Among cases missing attendance information, 82% were in the com-
pulsory category. Aside from missing data, there are other potential explanations for the
difference in attendance by compulsory assignment. For example, what people thought
counted as school attendance could have changed with the law. Before the law, families
or census takers may have counted attendance of even one day. After the law, however,
reports may not count a child as attending school unless they met the legal compulsory
requirements. Regardless of the explanation, however, of primary interest here is the
relationship between school attendance and father’s occupation—not raw attendance
data.
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in the regular census data ðtable 3Þ, the correlation between father’s SEI
and school attendance is significantly higher ð0.05Þ among those not re-
quired to attend school than among those required to attend ð0.01Þ. This
difference is consistent with the idea that compulsory laws increased class
equality in school attendance.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Analysis proceeds in four steps. First, proportional hazard models inves-
tigate state characteristics related to the timing of early compulsory laws.
All later analyses control for time-varying measures of the factors that best
predict the timing of the laws among states outside the South to help rule
out the possibility that some state characteristic is driving both an early
compulsory law and any change in mobility. Tables 2 and 3 include these
state measures and show that there are significant differences between the
compulsory and noncompulsory means of these measures.18
Second, regressions investigate the effects of compulsory laws on school
attendance by father’s occupation. The hypothesized effects of the laws
on mobility are based on the assumption that they made school attendance
more equal by class. This second step asks whether this is true and sets the
stage for step 3.19 Third, the main analysis uses a variety of techniques
to investigate the effect of compulsory laws on intergenerational mobility.
The fourth step investigates potential explanations for the results found in
step 3 using state-level data on school spending, teacher-to-student ratios,
and youth employment.
Preliminary Analysis: Effects of the Compulsory Laws on Attendance
Compulsory laws are exogenous at the individual level. Individuals cannot
self-select into being required to attend school. Aside from random differ-
ences, age at the time of the law ðwhich can be controlledÞ should be the only
difference between those required to attend and those not required to attend.
Regression discontinuity ðRDÞ exploits a cutoff, such as that created by
compulsory attendance laws, as leverage to approach a causal estimate. By
examining the difference between a treatment and control group within a
narrow window around an assigned cutoff point, regression discontinuity
18Details about this preliminary analysis are not included here but are available upon
request. Controls include manufacturing employment rate, white illiteracy rate, Demo-
crat governor, proportion of adjacent states with the law, proportion elderly, proportion
foreign born, manufacturing production per employee, years since union membership,
and proportions of elderly and adjacent states with the law multiplied by years since
1850 to allow their effects to vary over time.
19The most relevant analyses and results of this step are included here. More details are
available in Rauscher ð2014Þ.
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provides a causal estimate of the treatment effect among otherwise similar
individuals ðImbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Card 2008; Lee and Le-
mieux 2010Þ. Key assumptions include the following: meaningful unob-
served differences between those within a narrow window on either side of
the cutoff are eliminated; and other factors related to the outcome vary con-
tinuously over the assignment variable, which is controlled in the regres-
sion ðLee and Lemieux 2010, p. 287Þ. Limiting analysis to a narrow win-
dow on both sides of the treatment cutoff leaves individuals who should
be similar, except for observed ðand controlledÞ differences in the forcing
variable that assigns individuals to the treatment group.
To check the validity of the RD approach, I look for discontinuities in
the forcing variable and in a variety of measures by the forcing variable.
Discontinuities in the density of the forcing variable could suggest that
individuals manipulated themselves around the cutoff ðMcCrary 2008Þ. In
this case, individuals could have lied about their age to avoid being re-
quired to attend school and compulsory assignment would no longer be
exogenous. Discontinuities in other variables that should be unrelated to
the forcing variable could suggest that the RD assumptions do not hold. I
do not find evidence of sharp discontinuities in the forcing or other vari-
ables, which supports the validity of the RD approach here. The appendix
includes graphs of the forcing variable and a few key covariates ðfather’s
SEI, father’s age, and manufacturing production per employee; others are
available upon requestÞ.
Figure 2 illustrates the RD approach. In this analysis, the sample is lim-
ited to a small window 10 years on either side of the compulsory assign-
ment cutoff.20 RD requires controlling for the forcing variable ðin this case
age at the time of law, called CompCohort in eq. ½1Þ, which determines
whether an individual was ever required to attend school. Equation ð1Þ
also interacts the assignment variable with the treatment—b5—to allow
the relationship to vary between treatment ðcalled CompSchoolÞ and con-
trol groups. Models only include states with statistical support ði.e., states
passing the law in or before 1890Þ, meaning they have individuals in both
the treatment and control groups.
InSchoolijkm 5 a1 b1DadOccijkm 1 b2CompSchoolijkm
1 b3DadOccijkm  CompSchoolijkm 1 b4CompCohortijkm
1 b5CompCohortijkm  CompSchoolijkm 1 b6Xijkm
1 Cohortð5yrsÞj 1 CensYrk 1 Statem 1 εijkm:
ð1Þ
20The width of the window involves a trade-off between internal validity and sample
size. Sensitivity checks using a five-year window are conducted for analyses based on the
indicator of whether an individual was ever required to attend school and yield similar
results. Investigation of the nonlinear pattern requires a 10-year window.
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With state, year, and cohort fixed effects and continuous age measures, b1
represents the association between father’s occupation score and likelihood
of attending school ðclass inequality in school attendanceÞ for individuals
not required to attend school, b2 is the relationship between compulsory
assignment and school attendance among those with mean father’s occu-
pation score, and b3 1 b1 is the association between father’s occupation
and school attendance for those required to attend school. The parameter
of interest—b3—indicates the relationship between compulsory assign-
ment and class inequality in school attendance. If the compulsory law re-
duced class inequality in school attendance, b3 should be negative. Cohort
ðin five-year intervalsÞ, census year, and state fixed effects control for
changes over time and state differences.21 Controls ðrepresented by XÞ
include son’s age ðin both censuses in the linked census dataÞ and father’s
age in the first census ðand squared terms for eachÞ as well as rural resi-
dence, group quarters residence, state measures related to the timing of
compulsory laws, and an interaction of compulsory assignment with every
control variable in the model. In addition, all models control for the pro-
portion of the total state population of any age in school. This allows more
precise estimates of compulsory effects on attendance among school-age
21Potentially important changes over time include economic depressions ðthe Panic of
1873 and depressions in 1882–85 and 1893–96Þ andwars ðthe CivilWar andWorldWar IÞ.
Year fixed effects adjust for any differences associated with a particular year, including
depression or war. In the long term, compulsory attendance could reduce the likelihood
of depression if it promotes economic growth. However, I limit analysis to a narrow win-
FIG. 2.—Regression discontinuity design—10-year “treatment” and control window
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youth targeted by the law and rules out the possibility that overall rising
school enrollment rates drove changes in school-age attendance ormobility.
I use a linear probability model for ease of interpretation and comparability
with the main analysis, but sensitivity analyses using logistic regression
yield consistent results.
Main Analysis: Effects of the Compulsory Laws on Mobility
While state-level factors were related to the timing of the law, the precise
year it passed is random at the individual level. An individual who just
happened to be school age when the law passed was required to attend
while his counterpart—just a year or two older—was exempt. Aside from
age differences and whether or not they were required to attend school,
individuals within a narrow window on either side of the compulsory age
cutoff are assumed to be similar. I first show father-son SEI correlations,
which do not allow controls for age or other differences.
RD models allow a more sophisticated analysis, including a variety of
state- and individual-level controls to identify the effect of compulsory
laws on intergenerational mobility. The RD model is the same as equation
ð1Þ, including all controls, but predicts son’s occupational attainment in-
stead of school attendance. In this model, b3 estimates whether intergener-
ational association differed by compulsory assignment among those within
10 years of the law.
Nonlinear Analysis
Complicating the above analysis, structural lag theory hypothesizes a
nonlinear relationship between educational expansion and mobility. To
investigate this possibility, I first graph intergenerational SEI correlation
by years of school required. Second, son’s occupational attainment is re-
gressed on years of school required ðcalled YrsReq in eq. ½2Þ and its square,
both interacted with father’s occupation score. Rather than using the sharp
cutoff of the RD approach above, equation ð2Þ allows each additional year
of schooling to matter. In equation ð2Þ, b4 estimates the linear relationship
between years of school required and intergenerational association and b5
the nonlinear relationship. Equation ð2Þ includes the same controls as the
dow around the compulsory law, and depressions occur at the national or industry-
specific level, not just the state level. Further, depressions occurred during many years
covered in this analysis, and excluding individuals in the 1930 census ðwhich measures
adult occupation during the Great DepressionÞ—or any other census year—yields sim-
ilar results.
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models above, including state, cohort, and census year fixed effects. Again,
the sample is limited to those 10 years on each side of the cutoff.
Occijkm 5 a1 b1DadOccijkm 1 b2YrsReqijkm 1 b3YrsReqijkm
2
1 b4YrsReqijkm DadOccijkm 1 b5YrsReqijkm2 DadOccijkm
1 b6Xijkm 1 Cohortð5yrsÞj 1 CensYrk 1 Statem 1 εijkm: ð2Þ
The above methods use continuous occupation measures. The appendix
discusses methods based on occupational categories, sibling pairs, and
state-level measures; results are consistent with those presented below.
Methodological Overview
I investigate effects of the law on equality of school attendance. Based on
those results, I use an intent-to-treat estimate of a large-scale policy change
to investigate the education-mobility relationship. While other studies
generally compare treated and untreated individuals, an intent-to-treat
estimate compares individuals who were assigned to the treatment ðin this
case, children required to attend schoolÞ to those who were not assigned to
the treatment ðnot required to attend schoolÞ, regardless of compliance
ðwhether or not they actually attendedÞ. By including all targeted youth,
the intent-to-treat estimate remains unbiased to heterogeneous responses to
treatment assignment or noncompliance ðFreedman 2006Þ. For example,
individuals who would not attend school regardless of being required may
have other disadvantages—such as poverty or disability—that would also
dampen their occupational attainment. Those who attend regardless of
compulsory assignment may similarly attain higher occupational status.
Finally, being required to attend may perversely encourage some students,
who would have attended otherwise, to work instead if the law increased
demand for child laborers. These defiers would bias an instrumental var-
iable ðor treatment-on-the-treatedÞ estimate. An intent-to-treat estimate is
robust to these responses and also allows compulsory laws to influence mo-
bility through mechanisms other than school attendance ðFreedman 2006Þ.
Overall, this approach provides a rare opportunity to address some en-
dogeneity in the apparent link between education and mobility during a
large-scale change.22 It helps to understand what happens when a policy
changes rather than just how a treatment affects a few individuals.
22One limitation of examining a large-scale policy change is potential violation of the
stable unit treatment value assumption ðSUTVAÞ. That is, causal inference relies on the
assumption that cases are independent or that the treatment of one individual does not
influence that of another. In this case, individuals required to go to school could have
encouraged attendance among those not required to attend. Alternatively, those in the
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Like previous research, this study uses state compulsory attendance laws
to account for individual selection into education. However, to build on
existing research, this project ð1Þ examines effects on intergenerational occu-
pational mobility rather than occupational attainment or earnings; ð2Þ uses
the first compulsory enrollment law in each state, which may affect a larger
group of youth than the later changes to these laws used in other research;
ð3Þ uses an intent-to-treat estimate; and ð4Þ controls for factors related to the




Results suggest that the compulsory laws increased equality of school at-
tendance. At the state level, figure 3 shows a sharp increase in average state
attendance rates for white, low-SEI boys between the censuses on either
side of the compulsory law. However, higher-SEI youth do not show the
same pattern; there is no change in high-SEI attendance rates between the
censuses immediately before and after the law. The class gap in boys’
school attendance narrows with the compulsory school laws.
Regression results support the equalizing effect of the compulsory laws
on attendance.23 As table 4 shows, father’s occupation was significantly less
related to school attendance under the compulsory law. The equalizing ef-
fect of compulsory schooling holds with or without controls for state and
individual residential differences ðmodels 1 and 3Þ. Thus, comparing oth-
erwise similar young men, compulsory assignment significantly increased
equality of school attendance.24 As models 2 and 4 show, this effect does not
follow a nonlinear pattern. The relationship between father’s SEI and at-
tendance decreases with each additional year of required schooling but
does not differ by its square.
23State-level regression results are shown in the appendix.
24Although educational attainment is not included in any census until 1940, supple-
mentary analyses based on the 1940 census find that early compulsory laws significantly
reduced the educational attainment gap between white and nonwhite men ðRauscher
2014Þ. Father’s class is not available among the cohorts affected by early compulsory
laws in the 1940 census because they are elderly, but using race as a proxy for class
background suggests that compulsory laws significantly increased equality in educa-
tional attainment as well as attendance.
noncompulsory group could have learned from those in the compulsory group without
ever attending school. Both of these potential spillover effects should generate social re-
turns to compulsory schooling and, by providing more equal access to school-related skills,
lead me to underestimate individual returns. Therefore, this potential underestimation
increases the likelihood of finding support for conflict theory over status attainment and
structural lag arguments.
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Effects on Mobility
As the bottom of table 2 shows, within 10 years of the passage of the
compulsory law intergenerational correlations are slightly higher among
those required to attend school, but the differences are not significant.
Similarly, figure 4 illustrates that the father-son SEI correlation is slightly
higher among sons required to attend school for one to five years than those
never required to attend.
However, examining the group required to attend for six to nine years
provides evidence of a nonlinear relationship. In other words, the corre-
lation results suggest that immediately after the law intergenerational as-
sociation increased for the first five years and then declined again during
the next five years. Mobility decreased and then increased, not quite re-
turning to prelaw levels. The differences in these correlations, however, are
not significant.
Results from the full RD model in table 5 echo the correlations. With all
controls included, the interaction effect between compulsory school and
FIG. 3.—Average state attendance of school-age white males by census from com-
pulsory law. Sample excludes states passing the law after 1890. Data are from IPUMS
Individual Census Data, 1850–1920. Horizontal lines indicate the census years imme-
diately before and after the compulsory law in each state. Compulsory laws are related
to educational expansion; the first census after the law shows greater equality in atten-
dance by father’s occupational status and a greater increase in attendance for youth from
lower-status backgrounds ðfather’s SEI < 14Þ.
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father’s SEI is positive and significant ðb 5 0.04; P < .05Þ.25 Expanding
school attendance by class background appears to have increased inter-
generational association. Intergenerational mobility is therefore lower for
sons required to attend school.26 When limiting the sample to adults ages
30–64, however, the RD models in table 6 suggest that there is no linear
effect of compulsory school assignment on intergenerational association.
Nonlinear Mobility Pattern
Complicating the story to allow a nonlinear effect offers a more complete
picture. Years of required schooling has a nonlinear relationship with mo-
bility. With or without controls, models 2 and 4 in table 5 find that the in-
teractions between father’s SEI and both years of school required and its
square are significant. Figure 5 illustrates the nonlinear pattern. Sons re-
quired to attend four years of school experienced the strongest association
with father’s SEI—accruing the greatest boost for higher paternal SEI
scores. In contrast, those required to attend the maximum of nine years
saw the lowest return to father’s SEI ðnearly the same as those never re-
quired to attendÞ and the most mobility. This nonlinear pattern holds when
limiting the sample to adults ages 30–64 ðtable 6Þ.
To summarize, compulsory laws made school attendance more equal by
social background. However, contrary to common assumptions and status
attainment arguments, this greater equality in access to education appears
to have been accompanied by lower intergenerational mobility ðor at least
unchanged mobility among older adults ages 30–64Þ. A more complicated
picture emerges when allowing effects to vary by years of school required;
this strategy reveals a nonlinear relationship between years of school re-
quired and intergenerational association. In other words, the earliest co-
horts—those required to attend only a few years—experienced lower mo-
bility, while mobility returned to prelaw levels among those required to
attend closer to nine years. This nonlinear pattern remains when limiting
25Regressions use standardized SEI measures, so coefficients do not need to be adjusted
for changes in the distribution between generations.
26 In model 3, table 5, the coefficient for father’s SEI score is 0.19 among noncompulsory
sons and 0.23 among sons required to attend school. This is lower than the 0.4–0.6 es-
timate consistently found in studies of earnings elasticity using more recent data ðMa-
zumder 2005; Jantti et al. 2006Þ, which may reflect measurement ðstandardized SEI as
opposed to log earningsÞ or model differences. For example, in model 1 with fewer con-
trols, the coefficient of father’s SEI score is 0.23 and 0.27 for noncompulsory and com-
pulsory individuals. The difference could also indicate higher mobility in the late 1800s
ðFerrie 2005Þ. A recent analysis suggests that higher estimates of late-1800s mobility
reflect an overrepresentation of sons of farmers, all of whom cannot remain on the farm
ðXie and Killewald 2010Þ. However, results from this study are similar when excluding
sons of farmers or including an indicator for that group ðwith or without a “farm years
required” interactionÞ.
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the sample to adults ages 30–64, with a narrower difference in age at oc-
cupation between the compulsory and noncompulsory groups ðtable 6Þ.
The nonlinear pattern also holds in a variety of sensitivity checks, in-
cluding use of occupational income scores, a categorical measure of class,
and sibling pair analyses ðsee the appendixÞ.27
Understanding the Nonlinear Relationship
The nonlinear pattern is surprising but consistent with the idea that the
school system was unprepared for the policy change and slow to respond.
While I cannot definitively explain the nonlinear mobility pattern here,
this section investigates potential contributing factors. Evidence is most
consistent with a structural lag explanation, but other possible explana-
tions cannot be ruled out.
As suggested by the structural lag argument, school quality may initially
have become less equal after the compulsory laws. For example, because
the laws had the greatest effect on low-SEI attendance, it is plausible that
schools in lower-class areas became more crowded and enrolled older and
27To address potential concerns that results reflect changes in the occupational distri-
bution, I add controls for state occupational score distributions, including state SEI
mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, or changes in these state measures
between individual observation years. Results remain unchanged.
FIG. 4.—Correlation of father-son SEI scores by required school attendance. Non-
compulsory sample includes sons 10 years beyond the compulsory attendance treatment
cutoff. The sample is weighted to represent the population. Data are from IPUMS Linked
Representative Samples, 1850–1930.
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more difficult or disruptive types of students, who would otherwise have
been “street urchins” or truants. Very little historical research has investi-
gated school or neighborhood segregation in the late 1800s. In perhaps the
most relevant study, Zunz ð1982Þ examines ethnic and class segregation in
Detroit from 1880 to 1920. He finds a very high degree of segregation, par-
ticularly by ethnicity but increasingly by class, coupled with strong class
inequality by ethnicity. Importantly, Zunz ð1982Þ notes the tight connection
to neighborhood institutions, such as churches and schools. This is con-
sistent with the structural lag explanation because, given strong segregation
and ties to neighborhood schools, children would likely attend school in
their own neighborhood with others from similar social backgrounds.
Because the compulsory laws targeted, and primarily affected, lower-class
children, the effect of the laws would be unequally distributed across
schools within the same city. Schools primarily attended by higher-class
children would not have experienced the same crowding and disruption as
those in lower-class areas. Thus, through structural lag, compulsory laws
may initially have reduced mobility by unintentionally making the quality
of schooling less equal. In statistical terms, the compulsory laws may have
reduced the quality of schooling among “always-takers” from lower- but not
higher-class backgrounds.
Public school funding is consistent with the structural lag explanation.
Figure 6a shows mean state public school spending per capita by census
from the compulsory law. Average school spending increased at a constant
rate until the first census before the law. The first census after the law shows
a continuation of previous public school spending levels. However, by the
second census after the compulsory law, school funding had increased
sharply and continued to rise drastically several censuses after the law. In
other words, school funding did not anticipate the increased burden that
compulsory laws would place on schools.
School funding could help mobility recover by increasing the teacher-to-
student ratio. Figure 6b shows that the average state teacher-to-student
ratio remained flat through the first census after the compulsory law. By the
second census after the law, however, the ratio of teachers to students had
increased sharply. Funding also enabled new and more attractive schools
ðe.g., five years after the New York compulsory attendance law, New York
City built four new schools and expanded several othersÞ as well as the
conversion of common into graded schools; both of these changes attracted
more students and encouraged more consistent attendance ðCutler 1989;
Lassonde 1996Þ. Graded schools separated students into grade levels based
on age and academic progress, thus providing a structural response to the
increasing diversity of students. Rather than trying to teach students of all
levels in one room, graded schools allowed greater efficiency by targeting
students at a similar level, but at the same time increased inequality within
Educational Equality and Mobility
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and between schools ðstudents faced unequal chances of failing a grade or
dropping out based on social background and city; Ayres 1909Þ.
Finally, as suggested by Lassonde ð1996Þ for late 19th-century New
Haven, compulsory schooling may initially have been ineffectively enforced
in all towns. Lax enforcement, however, does not seem able to explain the
nonlinear mobility pattern because a nonlinear relationship is not found for
equality of school attendance. In addition, even lax enforcement should
encourage—not initially discourage—attendance.
To summarize, states maintained initial levels of school funding and
teacher-student ratios after the laws. After a short lag, however, both mea-
sures increased sharply. Thus, despite higher attendance rates and new
types of students who were more difficult to teach, there was little institu-
tional response at first. After this initial lag, the data suggest that school
systems adjusted to the policy change, increased funding, and increased the
teacher-student ratio.
An alternative explanation for the nonlinear pattern involves the rela-
tionship between school attendance and youth employment. Boys whowere
required to attend for only a few years may have sacrificed work oppor-
tunities that could have facilitated mobility without spending enough time
in school to gain skills relevant for the job market. However, examining
child employment rates reveals a continuous linear decline through the
FIG. 5.—Predicted intergenerational association by years of compulsory attendance.
This figure shows son’s SEI increase ðin standard deviation unitsÞ for each standard
deviation increase in father’s SEI score by years of school required. Sample is limited to
sons 10 years on either side of the compulsory attendance treatment cutoff and weighted
to represent the population. Estimates based on model 4 in table 5. Data are from
IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930.
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FIG. 6.—A, Mean state public school spending per capita 1850–1920. Sample excludes
states passing the law after 1890. Public school spending per capita measures total state
spending on public schools per total state population each census year ðexcluding spend-
ing on colleges, academies, postsecondary, and normal schoolsÞ. Years 1850–1870 are
based on total school income for all schools.B, Mean state teacher-to-student ratio 1850–
1920. Sample excludes states passing the law after 1890. Teacher-to-student ratio mea-
sures the ratio of people employed as teachers to total students in a state. Data are from
ICPSR ð1970Þ and U.S. Bureau of the Census ð1975Þ.
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compulsory law. Figure 7 graphs mean state employment rate among school-
age white boys. There is no change in the rate of decline with the law, which
suggests that the law did not affect employment. This makes sense because
the laws generally had flexible attendance requirements ðe.g., 12 weeks with
six of them consecutiveÞ. Some areas even had evening school. These flexi-
ble arrangements would allow a child to work while attending school. Note,
however, that youth employment data are only available from 1880, so un-
like the rest of the analyses in this article, figure 7 includes all states rather
than only states with early compulsory laws. In addition, steadily declining
employment rates could mask sharp decreases in hours worked, translating
into less work experience or job skill development. The school flexibility
noted above would help maintain work hours and skill development, but
employment rates alone cannot rule out this youth employment explanation
for the nonlinear pattern.
Another possibility is that labor demands created by many youth leaving
the workforce to attend school may have increased child wages for a short
period after the law, which unequally discouraged attendance among the
poor and initially reduced mobility. However, figure 7 belies this large drop
in employment and, based on limited child wage data for 1870–1900 from
the Census Bureau, mean state child wages do not show a sharp increase
FIG. 7.—Employment rates among school-age white men. Sample includes all states
because youth employment information is not available until 1880. Data are from
IPUMS Individual Census Data, 1850–1930.
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after the law. If anything, the growth of child wages decreases after the law
regardless of whether I use CPI adjusted, GDP deflated, or raw wages.
A third potential explanation for the nonlinear mobility pattern, con-
sistent with conflict theory, is that upper-class parents initially panicked
about the compulsory laws, possibly fearing schools would be flooded by
lower-class kids who would “contaminate” their children with lower-class
behaviors and culture. As a result of this anxiety, they may have moved
their children to a better quality school. To explain the nonlinear pattern,
however, after an initial period of panic these high-SEI parents would
have had to move their children back to their previous school or allowed
low-SEI children equal access to their elite schools. In other words, this
“elite flight” explanation would have had to be short-lived in order to ex-
plain the nonlinear mobility pattern.
In summary, evidence supports a structural lag explanation for the non-
linear mobility pattern.28 However, because length of required attendance
is confounded with time since the law, I cannot definitively identify which
of these is the driving factor. Furthermore, other potential explanations for
the nonlinear relationship include elite flight, youth employment, youth
wages, or ineffective enforcement. While I briefly address each of these
above, space limitations rule out further analysis here. Future research
should further investigate these and other potential explanations.
CONCLUSION
Evidence of a relationship between compulsory laws and mobility contra-
dicts arguments that relative mobility is not systematically related to policy
or other changes ðSorokin 1959; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992Þ. Although
compulsory laws made school attendance more equal, results of the above
analyses suggest that they initially reduced intergenerational mobility. Af-
28Articles in the New York Times are also consistent with this scenario. For five years
before the compulsory law in New York, there were no articles complaining about
school crowding or the need for separate truant schools in the New York Times. Shortly
after New York made attendance compulsory in 1874, however, a rash of these articles
appeared in the New York Times. For example, in 1877, “unruly and vagrant children
cannot be kept in school, and . . . when there they corrupt the good and industrious
children” ðNew York Times 1877Þ. A year later, another article states, “As is well known,
we have not school room enough in certain wards, and we provide too much for the well
off and too little for the poor” ðNew York Times 1878Þ. TheNew York Times articles that
note crowding and disruption ðor the need for separate truant schools to house dis-
ruptive studentsÞ sprang up immediately after the compulsory law in 1874 and declined
about five years after the law. That year, in 1879, New York City built four new schools
and expanded several others to try to meet demand for school space. Thus, these his-
torical documents from New York are consistent with the institutional lag argument—
that the school system was slow to respond to the policy change.
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ter this initial reduction, mobility increased again, returning to prelaw lev-
els after about 10 years.
Studying early 20th-century Iowa, Parman ð2011Þ finds a similar decline
in ðincomeÞ mobility following public school expansion. He suggests that
this decrease may have dissipated over time—as lower-income families
caught up to faster-responding higher-income families—but data limita-
tions prevent him from investigating that possibility. Using data that span
multiple census years and cohorts, this study finds evidence of such a non-
linear relationship between educational expansion and mobility. Applica-
tions of conflict theory typically rely on upper-class action to explain repro-
duction of inequality ðCollins 1971Þ. In this case, however, the compulsory
laws primarily affected lower-class children, which suggests that the initial
decline in mobility did not require action by upper-class families.
Rather, evidence supports a structural lag explanation. Even without elite
efforts to maintain advantage, it seems that educational expansion through
compulsory attendance laws inadvertently reduced mobility through insti-
tutional inertia. School funding and teacher-to-student ratio data indicate
that the school system was initially unprepared for the policy change and,
as a result, was slow to respond to the new educational policy landscape.
Because of this institutional lag, school quality became less equal and mo-
bility initially declined until the system caught up and mobility bounced
back to prelaw levels.
This study uses historical data, which raises concerns about generalizing
to today. First, the economy was going through rapid industrialization in
the late 1800s, whereas today we live in a knowledge economy ðPowell and
Snellman 2004Þ. Equalizing a nonuniversal level of education such as col-
lege could increase mobility today. Second, this study is about raising the
minimum level of schooling to primary school attendance, not secondary or
postsecondary school, which is where current equalizing efforts are fo-
cused. Students in the late 1800s were learning to read, write, and do basic
arithmetic. Effects could differ at the postsecondary level. Third, the U.S.
population was different in the late 1800s; a large proportion of families
were first or second generation immigrants, religious and ethnic differences
were fraught with tension, and inequalities were stark. Finally, the study is
limited to white men. I exclude nonwhites and women because of concerns
about their intergenerational data quality and to stack the odds in favor
of status attainment arguments, which expect education to boost occupa-
tional opportunity most for white men ðbecause of discrimination against
women and minoritiesÞ. However, including women and nonwhites could
yield different results. The above points limit the weight these findings
carry today.
Despite the limitations of historical data, results suggest two potentially
important implications for today. First, institutions must be prepared for a
American Journal of Sociology
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policy change. In the case described above, the education system should
have received additional funding before the policy change to prepare to ab-
sorb more and new types of students. This idea seems simple, but contem-
porary policy makers do not always appreciate it. The California Class
Size Reduction ðCCSRÞ program is a good example of this inadequate prep-
aration ðBohrnstedt and Stecher 2002Þ. In 1996, California mandated
smaller class sizes for kindergarten through third grade. However, the state
was not prepared with enough classrooms or qualified teachers, so stu-
dents were learning in temporary classrooms with less qualified teachers.
Qualified teachers also became less equally distributed, with unqualified
teachers concentrated in schools with the most disadvantaged students.
Thus even today, policies that could have important equalizing effects can
actually exacerbate inequality due to inadequate planning and prepara-
tion. The unintended consequences found here and with the CCSR pro-
gram remind us that evidence from a small-scale context may not scale up
to the national level. Put simply, well-intentioned reforms can have unantic-
ipated negative consequences ðApple 2008Þ.
While the above example relates to elementary school, contemporary
educational expansion efforts are concentrated at the postsecondary level
in the United States and other developed countries. For example, President
Obama’s American Graduation Initiative seeks to increase college atten-
dance and graduation. While my analysis of primary school expansion is
not directly applicable to present-day U.S. efforts given the limitations men-
tioned above, the essential lesson about preparation may still prove useful
to contemporary policy makers. Namely, postsecondary institutions should
be properly funded and prepared for higher enrollment rates and new types
of students prior to any expansion policies.
Second, results are relevant for the developing world, where many
countries are working to achieve universal primary schooling. Raising the
minimum level of schooling may not necessarily increase mobility. Fur-
thermore, efforts to maintain school quality ðe.g., through additional fund-
ing or schoolsÞ should accompany any increases in attendance to coun-
teract potential crowding and disruption.
Where previous research has estimated the effect of education on indi-
viduals, the more complicated, nonlinear relationship found here could re-
flect the large-scale change. As existing research has found, educational
expansion often initially increases inequality in education ðRaftery and Hout
1993; Torche 2005; Paterson and Iannelli 2007Þ. Building on that work, this
study finds a similar effect of educational expansion with respect to inter-
generational occupational mobility. In this case, however, the declining
opportunity appears to have occured as a result of institutional inactivity
rather elite efforts to maintain advantage. The evidence presented here of
course represents a particular historical context. Additional research should
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investigate the relationship between education and mobility in other con-
texts. Overall, however, this historical evidence offers a pessimistic view
of educational expansion as a mechanism to facilitate intergenerational
mobility in the short term. While educational expansion undoubtedly car-
ries other important benefits ðe.g., for crime, health, and economic growth;
Lochner and Moretti 2004; Lleras-Muney 2005; Lutz, Crespo Cuaresma,
and Sanderson 2008Þ, if the aim is equal occupational opportunity, edu-
cation may not be an easy answer. At the very least, efforts to expand access
to education should devote special attention to preparing for the policy
change, with particular focus on early cohorts and disadvantaged families.
APPENDIX
Supplementary Analyses
Analysis of Occupational Categories
This sensitivity analysis uses log linear models to assess the degree of rel-
ative mobility experienced by sons on either side of the law after accounting
for occupational change ðabsolute mobilityÞ between the two generations.
By dividing sons into categories based on years of school required, the log
linear analysis comes closer to a causal estimate than most applications of
this method and allows a nonlinear investigation by years of attendance
required.
Measure—Occupational Categories
Ganzeboom et al. ð1992Þ point out several advantages to continuous mea-
sures of occupational status and find that their international socioeconomic
index compares favorably with the classic Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Port-
acarero ð1979Þ scheme ðEGP categoriesÞ. Specifically, Ganzeboom et al.
suggest that ð1Þ some EGP categories are not internally homogeneous, with
different mobility chances for some occupations in the same EGP category;
ð2Þmultivariate analysis is more feasible with continuous measures, which
allows more informative results; and ð3Þ log linear analyses can scale EGP
categories on one dimension and measure class distance without much loss
of information.
Nevertheless, there are equally important reasons to incorporate cate-
gorical analyses. First, as Ganzeboom et al. note, continuous measures may
not deal adequately with immobility or absolute mobility. Specifically, con-
tinuous measures can hide the greater degree of immobility in specific cat-
egories ði.e., farmers and professionalsÞ; they treat immobility as just one
variety of mobility rather than a distinct process; and there may be greater
American Journal of Sociology
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distinctions between some categories than a continuous measure would
suggest. Second, sons of farmers make up a large proportion of the pop-
ulation in the late 1800s ðapproximately 50% of the sampleÞ and greater
mobility out of farming could swamp results for other groups if changes in
the marginal occupational distribution are not adequately addressed ðas
Xie and Killewald ½2010 argueÞ. Third, occupational mobility research has
long used occupational categories, partly to address distributional changes
between generations. For all of these reasons, the relationship between early
compulsory schooling laws and mobility is also investigated using occupa-
tional categories.
I assign occupations to categories based on the EGP classification sys-
tem, which is widely used in social mobility studies ðHout 1989; Erikson
and Goldthorpe 1992; Torche 2011Þ. The EGP scheme classifies occupa-
tions according to how difficult it is for employers to monitor performance
and how specific the required skills are ðGoldthorpe 2000Þ. Census occupa-
tion codes are translated to EGP categories using Morgan and Tang’s ð2007,
especially pp. S10–S21Þ coding scheme, which has previously been used in
mobility research ðTorche 2011Þ and is based on a variety of sources.29 Like
Morgan and Tang, I am unable to distinguish self-employed individuals or
managers by how many workers they supervise. This analysis therefore
excludes EGP category IV and may include more low-level managers than
appropriate in EGP category I. The resulting categories include upper non-
manual, lower nonmanual, skilled manual, nonskilled manual, and agri-
cultural occupations.
Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for each occupational category
among fathers and ðadultÞ sons by compulsory assignment. While the ma-
jority of fathers are in agriculture, there are only minor differences in fa-
ther’s occupation by son’s compulsory school assignment. Thus, compulsory
assignment is not related to father’s occupation category. As adults, however,
sons who were required to attend school are significantly less likely to be in
an agriculture or nonskilled manual occupation and are significantly more
likely to be in a nonmanual or skilled manual occupation. Figure A1 illus-
trates these distributions.
Methods—Mobility Tables and Uniform Difference Models
The uniform difference model ðErikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Xie 1992Þ—
unidiff—can identify differences in the intergenerational association of
29Specifically, Morgan and Tang ð2007Þ provide EGP categories for the 1980 and 1990
census occupation codes. The IPUMS Linked Representative Sample includes 1950
census occupation codes. I convert 1950 to 1990 census codes using the 1950 census,
which includes standardized occupation codes for both 1950 and 1990, and then cate-
gorize the 1990 census codes appropriately based on Morgan and Tang ð2007Þ.
Educational Equality and Mobility
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occupational categories by compulsory education. Unidiff classifies paren-
tal occupation by child occupation by compulsory category, hypothesizing
that transmission is similar regardless of compulsory assignment. Various
models are fit to the data, including full interaction ðflexible but lacking
parsimonyÞ, quasi-symmetry, and crossing models ðtreating occupations as
differing in attainment difficultyÞ. Each model is then unconstrained to
assess whether occupational association varies by compulsory exposure.
Most parsimoniously ðPowers and Xie 2000, pp. 141–42Þ, the unidiff effect
model is









where the t parameters control for marginal effects for rows ðR, father’s
EGP categoryÞ, columns ðC, child’s EGP categoryÞ, and layers ðL, com-
pulsory indicatorÞ, and their two-way interactions to best predict the
number of observations in each father-son-layer category. The local log
odds of attaining EGP category j given parental EGP level i for compul-
sory group k is calculated as
logðvÞijjk 5 ðwij 1 wði1 1Þð j1 1Þ− wið j1 1Þ− wði1 1ÞjÞfk 5 fklogðvijÞ: ðA2Þ
Bayesian information criteria ðBICÞ and likelihood ratio tests ðG2Þ are
used to select the model best balancing data fit and parsimony ðRaftery
1986, 1995Þ.30
To investigate a nonlinear relationship, intergenerational association is
allowed to vary by years of school required ðin five-year intervalsÞ. Unidiff
30BIC alone is insufficient because it may overvalue parsimony or simpler models
ðWeakliem 1999Þ.
FIG. A1.—Distribution of occupational categories among fathers and sons. Based on
table A1.
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models estimate the strength of association for those required to attend
6–10 years, 1–5 years, and zero years. If there is a nonlinear relationship,
intergenerational association should be highest for those required to attend
1–5 years ðthe first group required to attendÞ and then decrease for those
who had to attend longer.
Results
As Xie and Killewald ð2010Þ note, continuous measures could mischar-
acterize occupational mobility, particularly given the high proportion of
farming families in the late 1800s. Despite this concern, unidiff models of
intergenerational occupational association by compulsory schooling sup-
port results using continuous measures. Including five years ðbirth cohortsÞ
on each side of the compulsory cutoff, quasi-symmetry is the best-fitting
model according to both explained deviance and the BIC statistic. Allow-
ing mobility to vary by compulsory school assignment in a quasi-symmetry
model, the father-son occupational association is slightly stronger among sons
required to attend school. Results offer weak support, however; allowing as-
sociation to vary by compulsory assignment does not yield a lower BIC sta-
tistic but does increase explained deviance and improves fit based on the like-
lihood ratio test.
Categorical analysis also suggests a nonlinear relationship between
educational expansion and mobility. Figure A2 shows phi parameters by
years of school required for the five best-fitting unidiff models according to
BIC and deviance.31 Compared to those never required to attend and those
required to attend for longer, the earliest group—required to attend school
for just 1–5 years—had the strongest intergenerational association ðthe low-
est occupational mobilityÞ. The later group, required to attend 6–10 years,
experienced the lowest intergenerational association. All models show con-
sistent results; the father-son association is greatest among those required
to attend 1–5 years. The phi parameters depicted are scaled to one, which
does not change the model ðsee Xie 1992, p. 382Þ. When interpreting the
parameters shown in figure A2, only the ratio is of interest, not the mag-
nitude ðXie 1992Þ. The figure shows parameters scaled to one because that
makes it easier to interpret and compare across models. Thus, compared to
those never required to attend, men required to attend for 1–5 years had 6%
or 7% greater father-son occupational association, depending on the specific
model. In turn, those required to attend for 6–10 years had 9%–10% lower
father-son association ðgreater mobilityÞ than those required to attend for
31The five best-fitting models are quasi-homogeneous row and column effects, quasi-
symmetry, quasi-crossing parameters, quasi-row and column effects, and full interac-
tion/saturated. As fig. A2 shows, the results are not sensitive to model specification.
American Journal of Sociology
1744
This content downloaded from 129.237.045.152 on May 04, 2017 09:59:46 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
1–5 years. These results offer weak support, however, because allowing
association to vary by compulsory assignment does not consistently im-
prove model fit.32
To summarize, compulsory laws slightly reduced intergenerational mo-
bility initially. However, continuous and categorical analyses both suggest
a nonlinear relationship. Educational expansion reduced mobility for the
earliest cohorts, who were required to attend school for only a few years,
but increased it among later cohorts.
Analysis of Sibling Pairs
Methods—Sibling Difference Analysis
Some siblings appear in the linked data; they were living in the same
household as children, had the same last name, andwere related to the head
of household as children. Given that brothers share family background,
these siblings help identify compulsory education effects. Birth order is con-
founded with exposure to compulsory education, because those required to
attend more years are always younger. However, sibling differences suggest
whether compulsory education effects from other models are due to family
32Unidiff models ðallowing intergenerational association to vary by age at the time of the
lawÞ do not yield a lower BIC statistic but slightly increase explained deviance and
improve fit based on the likelihood ratio test ðthough insignificantlyÞ.
FIG A2.—Intergenerational association by years of required attendance—phi param-
eters. Data are from IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930. Weighted to
adjust for linking and represent the population. Excludes those who are over age 14 at
time 1, under age 17 at time 2, not related to head of household, nonwhite, in states
passing the compulsory law after 1890 at time 1, older foreign born ðforeign and over age
seven at time 1Þ, and missing individual or father’s occupational data.
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factors. Elder brother SEI score minus younger brother SEI score measures
elder brother advantage. On average, elder brothers achieved higher SEI
scores than younger siblings. Presumably, compulsory education should al-
low more equal occupational attainment between older and younger broth-
ers. Therefore, if compulsory assignment increased sibling SEI difference,
it would suggest that younger brothers experienced less mobility ðless equal
opportunityÞ from compulsory schooling. A decrease in sibling SEI differ-
ence would suggest that compulsory assignment increased mobility.
Analysis is conducted at the sibling pair level. Difference in sibling
occupational SEI attainment is regressed on difference in years of
schooling required and its square, controlling for age differences. Because
of the small number of brother pairs in which the older brother never had
to attend school and the younger did ðN 5 22 pairsÞ, this is an ancillary
analysis and controls are limited, but results should echo those from the
main analysis.
Results
The same nonlinear relationship appears in the analysis of sibling pairs.
The main effect for difference in years required is insignificant. However,
adding a squared term makes them both significant, and model fit statistics
ðBIC, AIC, and log likelihoodÞ all suggest that the squared term offers a
significant improvement in model fit. Figure A3 shows the nonlinear re-
lationship in predicted sibling SEI differences, and table A2 provides the
regression results. Status attainment or industrialization theory might ex-
pect a steady decline in elder brother advantage as younger brothers are
required to attend additional years of school. Instead, elder brother ad-
vantage is greatest when the younger brother had to attend a few years and




State-level school attendance rates are calculated at each census year using
the regular census data. Separate state attendance rates are calculated
among school-age boys with low-SEI fathers ðless than 14Þ, high-SEI fa-
thers ðabove 14Þ, and farm fathers ðSEI of 14Þ. This cut point is chosen
because sons of farmers make up about half of the linked sample and,
given high mobility out of agriculture around the turn of the century ðXie
and Killewald 2010Þ, constitute a distinct group. Farmers have an SEI
score of 14, so that cutoff is chosen for the low and high SEI categories.
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Sons of fathers with SEI scores below 14 represent about 14%, while 33%
are above 14.
Methods
With indicators for each state ðuiÞ and year ðλjÞ included, equation ðA3Þ
estimates whether, compared to high-SEI boys, compulsory laws increased
attendance more for boys from farm and low-SEI backgrounds.
Attendance Rateijk 5 a1DadOcc Categoryk 1 b1CompSchoolijk
1 b2kCompSchoolijk DadOcc Categoryk
1 b3Xijk 1 ui 1 λj 1 ε ijk:
ðA3Þ
Indicators for father’s occupational category are interacted with a com-
pulsory school measure indicating whether attendance was compulsory in
a state at each census year. High SEI is the omitted category, so if com-
pulsory laws increased attendance more for lower-SEI youth, the two b2
coefficients should be positive and significant. Controls ðrepresented by XÞ
include the same state-level controls included in the individual analysis.
FIG. A3.—Predicted sibling SEI differences by difference in required schooling.
Predicted sibling difference in SEI scores ðelder brother minus younger brotherÞ by
difference in years of required schooling. Sample is limited to brother pairs who differed
in compulsory assignment. Coefficients and standard errors are shown in table A2. Data
are from IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930.
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To investigate the relationship between the laws and mobility, state-
level father-son SEI correlation is calculated at each census year. This mea-
sure of mobility is regressed on an indicator for whether the state had
passed a compulsory law yet, with indicators for each state ðuiÞ and year
ðλjÞ, and the same state controls as those in equations ð1Þ and ð2Þ. The co-
efficient for compulsory school in equation ðA4Þmeasures whether mobility
differs before and after the law.
Father-Son SEI Correlationij 5 a1 b1CompSchoolij
1 b2Xij 1 ui 1 λj 1 εij:
ðA4Þ
Results
Table A3 provides state attendance rates by SEI category and compulsory
law. The final column compares the difference in attendance before and
after the compulsory law by SEI category. At the descriptive level, these
differences show that state attendance rates increased at all SEI levels, but
they increased the most among low-SEI boys. State-level regression—
model 1 in table A4—provides similar evidence of an equalizing effect. Net
of state and census year differences, the compulsory law interaction with
the low-SEI category is positive and significant. This suggests that, com-
pared to higher-SEI boys, compulsory laws increased attendance more
among boys from low-SEI backgrounds.
State-level attendance rates differ from the individual-level school atten-
dance data ðdescriptive statistics shown in table 2 of the main textÞ partly
because the state data include more years and cohorts and partly because of
the unequal likelihood of appearing in the linked data by age or cohort. In
TABLE A2
Sibling Differences in SEI Scores
SIBLING SEI DIFFERENCE
VARIABLE Coefficient SE
Diff in years required . . . . . 28.44 10.34*
Diff in years required2 . . . . −3.04 .98**
Age difference . . . . . . . . . . . 1.61 1.02
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −48.72 21.04*
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
N sibling pairs . . . . . . . . . . 22
NOTE.—Predicted sibling difference in SEI scores ðelder brother
minus younger brotherÞ by difference in years of required schooling.
Sample is limited to brothers who differed in compulsory assignment.
Data are form IPUMS Linked Representative Samples, 1850–1930.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
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addition to missing attendance data for many of those observed as children
in 1880, the linked data are limited to those born before 1881 and only pro-
vide valid school attendance information among those who happen to be
age 8–13 at the first census observation, which eliminates anyone born after
1873. To make the state-level attendance analyses more comparable to the
sample in the individual-level linked data ðand individual attendance re-
sults in table 4 aboveÞ, I repeated the state-level attendance analyses based
only on years 1850–80 and found similar results ðshown in table A4Þ.
Despite this equalizing effect on attendance, state-level analyses suggest
that the laws did not increase mobility. Model 3 in table A4 shows that, net
of state and year differences, the intergenerational SEI association is lower
after the compulsory laws. However, this relationship is not significant. In
other words, mobility may have increased as a result of the compulsory
laws, but the difference is not significantly different from zero.
Analyzing nonlinear effects on mobility at the state level is difficult
because it is only possible to measure state mobility ðfather-son correla-
tionÞ each 10 years. Furthermore, sons must be adults in the linked census,
which limits state mobility data to censuses after 1870, and only states with
early compulsory laws in or before 1890 are examined here. Combined
with some states having too few sons in the linked data for valid corre-
lation measures, this yields only six states with mobility information before
the law ðthose with compulsory laws 1880–90Þ. ðThe small number of state
mobility observations before the law could explain the null relationship
with mobility found in model 3 of table A4.Þ Most important, state char-
acteristics are confounded with time since the law because a state was often
the only one to pass a law in a given year. These data limitations would
make state-level nonlinear analysis untrustworthy, and it is not pursued
here.
Regression Discontinuity Graphs
Graphs by the forcing variable: Compulsory cohort.—In all graphs ðfigs. A4–
A7Þ, compulsory cohort is centered at the cutoff so individuals in the range
210 to21 were required to attend school and those in the range 0 to 9 were
never required to attend.
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FIG. A4.—Frequency ðnumber of observations in the sampleÞ
FIG. A5.—Father’s SEI at time 1
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FIG. A6.—Father’s age at time 1
FIG. A7.—State manufacturing production per employee at time 1
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